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SUMMARY∗ 
It is generally accepted that financial support from the European Union generates 
a large growth surplus. These positive expectations are backed by potential effects 
of the structural funds calculated in model simulations by the European Commis-
sion. However, empirical studies of the real effects of the funds, measuring growth 
surpluses attributed to the process of catching up with richer EU economies, are 
few and far between. This paper aims to remedy this on the following logical ba-
sis. It first examines the processes and types of evaluation that have developed in 
the EU, and then some of the lessons to be drawn about the methods of analysis, 
by looking more closely at case studies, model simulations and econometric analy-
ses employed. The conclusion that emerges is that the regional policy intentions 
are only partly realized for various reasons, including the crowding-out effect of 
the financial aid, rent-seeking behaviour, and the moral hazard of the govern-
ments involved. 
                                                   
∗ Zsuzsanna Trón is a PhD student in the Faculty of Economics and Business Studies, University of 
Debrecen. 
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One of the major aims of EU regional policy1 
is to help reduce the income gap between 
richer and poorer regions (i.e. the economic 
and territorial disparities). The other major 
objective is to boost employment and deal 
with problems of social exclusion (i.e. social 
disparities). The EU spends significant sums 
on dedicated programmes to do so.  
Examination of almost twenty years’ ex-
perience with such policy at Community 
level poses the question of the extent to 
which the objectives have been attained—
how effectively and appropriately European 
taxpayers’ money has been spent. A well-
founded answer can be obtained by analys-
ing the policy, and this may help to formu-
late future policy. 
1) THE CONCEPT AND                            
DEVELOPMENT OF EVALUATION              
IN EU PRACTICE 
Evaluation of regional policy is relatively re-
cent in EU history. For various reasons, ap-
propriate systems were not employed ini-
tially—in 1975–88 (Bachtler and Michie 
1995).2 But by 1988, when the European 
                                                   
1 The expressions EU regional policy, EU cohesion 
policy and EU structural policy are used synony-
mously for the workings of the EU Structural Funds 
and Cohesion Fund, the main EU tools for helping the 
economic and social cohesion of member-states and 
regions. There were four structural funds in opera-
tion up to 2006: the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund, the orientation sec-
tion of the European Agriculture Guidance and Guar-
antee Fund, and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance. The cohesion fund gives support to larger 
programmes to develop environmental and transport 
infrastructure. Supports from structural funds are 
based on regions designated “target areas” or “objec-
tives”, or within so-called Community Initiatives. 
Support from the Cohesion Fund can be applied for 
by the least developed member-states, which before 
2006 were Greece, Portugal, Spain and the new 
member-states. For the system since 2007, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/object/i
ndex_en.htm. 
2 Bachtler and Michie (1995) list three reasons in 
their paper: (1) before 1988, Community aid and 
money devoted to regional development in member-
 
Commission received a big role in distribut-
ing Union funds, conflict between the Com-
mission and member-states intensified. So 
the most important and longest-established 
aim of evaluation was accountability (Bat-
terbury 2006). Thenceforward the Commis-
sion nominated the regions to receive finan-
cial aid, approved the development plans, 
and exercised oversight on development ex-
penditure. The demand for accountability 
was all the stronger as these were the biggest 
items of EU budget expenditure.3 So the 
evaluation system, monitoring, financial 
management and auditing became stricter 
and broader in the EU, along with attendant 
legal responsibilities. The situation is com-
plicated by the many organizations to be in-
cluded in the evaluation process, from pro-
gramme managers and partners, regional 
and national authorities, to various EU insti-
tutions, but in terms of results achieved 
through EU expenditure and achievement of 
programmes, each organization has differ-
ent interests (Bachtler and Wren 2006). 
Constructing an evaluation system for 
programmes in the member-states is not 
simple: there is no monitoring regulatory 
system at Community level. The need for 
monitoring is evident in Council regulations 
on the common budget but nothing is said 
about how to install it. For the 2007–13 
budget period the EU issued only working 
papers and guidance documents to assist the 
evaluation process. It did not deal with es-
tablishing a regulatory system for pro-
grammes that affect the common budget.4 
The basic aim of evaluation (or monitor-
ing) in the EU is not to provide an ex post 
analysis of the flow of funds, but “to provide 
                                                                              
states were mixed together; (2) the division of duties 
between administrative bodies was badly coordinated; 
and (3) the evaluation methods differed widely across 
Europe, particularly as they lacked Community 
guidelines. 
3 The increasing interest in evaluation of EU cohesion 
policy falls in with an international trend driven by 
demand for legitimization of government interven-
tion and justification for it (Bachtler and Wren 
2006). 
4 See  
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffi
c/working/sf2000_en.htm for details. 
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support for background examination of the 
execution of the development programmes” 
(Forman 2001:211). The task of monitoring, 
according to Rechniczer and Lados 
(2004:257) is “to account for the develop-
ments leading to regional development and 
the advancement of programmes, and in this 
way to their evaluation.” Like Forman (2001), 
they also point out that monitoring is not sim-
ply a financial and administrative control, but 
far more: to follow the course of development 
programmes, continually evaluate them, pro-
vide feedback on the achievement of goals, 
and to evaluate and systematize the regional 
effects of development. 
Though “evaluation” and “monitoring” 
have distinct meanings, they are regularly 
used synonymously in international and 
Hungarian literature. For the reader, the dif-
ference can perhaps be felt in the difference 
between the micro and the macro level, with 
evaluation referring to macro and monitor-
ing to micro-level assessment (Bradley 
2006:190). 
How can evaluation be performed? How 
can the existence of a policy be justified? 
How can it be shown that the money spent 
under regional policy has been well spent? 
According to Molle (2006:2), two things 
need to be measured: the policy has reached 
its objectives, i.e. been effective, and that no 
money has been wasted, i.e. that the policy 
has been efficient. Demonstrating effective-
ness and efficiency bring us close to an 
evaluation. 
The first step in evaluation is to see the 
logic in the intervention, to understand what 
it sets out to do and how (see EC 2001:5 and 
EC 2006:4). The key elements in this logic 
are inputs, projects (activities), outputs, re-
sults (short-term or initial impacts) and out-
comes (longer-term impacts)—see Figure 1. 
Often there is a SWOT analysis associated 
with the structure.5 
Completing the evaluation not only sheds 
light on the research question’s accountabil-
ity criterion (appropriate expenditure of 
taxpayers’ money), but improves the results 
of a certain phase of development policy, i.e. 
planning, programming and implementa-
tion—thereby improving performance (ef-
fectiveness and efficiency). Taking all this 
into consideration, the process can be re-
ferred to as learning (Molle 2006:2). 
                                                   
5 The diagram is returned to in the final chapter. 
Figure 1 
The key elements examined in evaluation of EU regional policy 
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Note: For the same diagram see EC 2001:9 or EC 2006:4. 
Source: Molle 2006:5. 
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2) TYPES OF EVALUATION 
The complexity of the evaluation (arising 
mainly from the divergent interests in-
volved) is increased further because it can 
appear in many forms. The guidelines and 
working documents that act as regulations 
only create a framework, while the national 
and regional environment, the institutional 
system and the nature of execution all differ. 
The culture of evaluation and the adminis-
trative capacity for such tasks also differs 
between member-states. While there is a 
strong tradition of evaluating regional de-
velopment in the northern European states, 
such specialized evaluation has yet to be-
come integral to the administrative system in 
some southern states, such as Greece and 
Italy (Bachtler and Wren 2006:149). 
Evaluation also differs from programme 
to programme. One programme can involve 
many areas of intervention (aimed at physi-
cal or economic infrastructure development, 
human resources, research, technological 
development and innovation environmental 
goals, support for small and medium-sized 
business, etc.) and a range of financial in-
struments that bring improvements to many 
beneficiaries. In addition, co-financing of 
programmes stipulates state or private capi-
tal contributions, which further complicate 
the picture. 
Thanks to the great interest shown in 
evaluation, EU cohesion policy and its ac-
companying methodology have also moved 
to the centre of attention and become dis-
puted areas. This is unsurprising considering 
the sums devoted to the policy6 and the pol-
icy’s role, but it is important to be aware of 
the many different types of analysis and 
methodology. 
                                                   
6 Based on the financial plan for 2007–13, the goals 
of EU cohesion policy are assigned 35.7 per cent of 
the total Union budget: €347.41 billion. 
Most disputes about evaluation rest from 
differences in philosophical foundations. 
Modern evaluation practice can be traced 
back to three philosophical traditions; posi-
tivism, constructivism and realism. Positiv-
ism assumes it is possible to obtain objective 
knowledge by making observations (Tavis-
tock Institute/GHK/IRS 2003:21). Separate 
individuals employing the same tools of ob-
servation and analysing their findings by 
objective techniques should arrive at the 
same results. The positivist tradition searches 
for regularity and laws (as in natural sci-
ence) and the description of regularity arises 
from aggregation of individual elements. 
However, there are many limitations to posi-
tivism in its pure form, e.g. the difficulty in 
observing the totality of reality, or the prob-
lem that the observer influences reality by 
being part of it. 
Of the post-positivist responses to the 
limitations of positivism, the most radical is 
constructivism, which rejects most positivist 
assumptions, including the existence of “ob-
jective” knowledge. Realism approaches the 
interpretation of explanations by concen-
trating on the various connections, elements, 
or framework assumptions, in an attempt to 
reveal the individual elements of programmes 
and policy background mechanisms (Arm-
strong and Wells 2006:263–266, Tavistock 
Institute/GHK/IRS, 2003:22). 
The various philosophical approaches use 
different evaluation methods. Positivism re-
mains the dominant tradition in analysis of 
the effects of the structural funds. This 
mainly involves top-down evaluations using 
statistical techniques, in which aggregated 
macro-level secondary data (such as re-
gional unemployment time series or indus-
trial location cross-sectional data) are col-
lected and analysed by various statistical 
methods such as time-series regression 
analysis or full econometric models, al-
though input-output analysis and comput-
able general equilibrium (CGE) models are 
also used (Armstrong and Wells 2006:264). 
Bottom-up approaches are used in the posi-
tivist model, where micro-level data are col-
lected and an attempt is made to aggregate 
them and generalize from them. The realist 
8 
approach tends to prepare studies based on 
large sample-size surveys of beneficiaries, 
similar to postal or telephone questionnaires, 
or more in-depth and narrower-focused in-
terviews. In other words, the approach con-
centrates on particularities and peculiarities, 
whereas the positivist approach searches for 
generalizations and empirical regularities 
(Armstrong and Wells 2006:265). 
The content of the evaluation can change 
as the programme progresses and can in-
clude evaluation before (ex ante), during 
(mid-term) and after (ex post) the pro-
gramme. Different evaluation methods can 
be applied to individual stages or levels (Ta-
ble 1). Comprehensive descriptions of the 
evaluation methods appear on the Union’s 
evaluation home page.7 
The table shows that the methods include 
micro (bottom-up) and macro (top-down) 
approaches. Micro-level analyses such as 
cost/benefit analysis have a familiar, well-
established research background (Mishan 
1988), but the literature on macroeconomic 
effects of Community interventions also has 
a solid research base (e.g. Romp and De 
Haan 2005). The two methodologies differ 
radically, as Table 2 shows, although at-
tempts have been made to integrate them 
(Bradley et al., 2005).  
The rest of the paper examines effective-
ness of EU regional policy, the best methods 
mainly being case studies, model simulations 
and econometric analysis. The literature is 
rich and the aim here is only to pinpoint dif-
ferences between evaluation types, not offer 
a full summary. The last chapter, despite the 
range of methods, sets out to draw conclu-
sions on efficiency of structural-fund opera-
tion of and identify criteria for more effi-
cient use of aid. 
 
                                                   
7 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/  
docgener/evaluation/evalsed/sourcebooks/method_ 
techniques/index_en.htm 
Table 1 
Methods and levels of evaluation 
 
Methods of evaluation 
Levels of evaluation 
Before 
(ex 
ante) 
Ongoing 
(mid 
term) 
After 
(ex 
post) 
Sociology-type methods    
1. SWOT analysis ++ +  
2. Document analysis ++ + + 
3. Personal interviews  + ++ 
4. Focus groups +  ++ 
5. Case studies   + 
6. Personal observations  +  
7. Expert panels ++  + 
8. Questionnaire surveys   + 
9. Delphi method +   
10. Comparison 
(benchmarking) +   
Exact methods expressi-
ble in parameters    
11. Geographical Infor-
mation System (GIS)  + + ++ 
12. Cost/benefit analysis ++ + + 
13. Shift-share analysis  + ++ 
14. Regression analysis  + ++ 
15. Factor analysis + + ++ 
16. Input/output model  + ++ 
17. Econometric model  + ++ 
Note: ++ = the most frequent evaluation level for 
methods used on more than one level. 
Source: Rechnitzer and Lados 2004:267. 
 
Table 2 
Trade-off between micro- and macro-approaches 
 
 Micro 
(bottom-up) 
Macro  
(top-down) 
General            
structure 
Informal , flexible, 
use of subjective 
elements 
Formal, complex, 
objective, based on 
behavioural theory 
Level of disag-
gregation 
High (individual 
projects) 
Low (aggregated, 
whole economy) 
Use of theories Weak (judge-
mental) 
Strong (macroeco-
nomics) 
Model               
calibration 
Judgemental, in-
formal 
Scientific, econo-
metrics 
Policy impacts Implicit/ranking Explicit/quan-
tified 
Treatment of 
externalities 
Usually ignored Usually explicitly 
modelled 
Source: Bradley et al., 2005:7. 
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3) CASE STUDIES 
“The case study is a tool of measurement 
which, based on the collection of data, pro-
vides a detailed analysis of the examined 
area of a special case to add to all the data 
available related to the subject. The main 
aim is to give the fullest possible picture of a 
given situation” (Rechnitzer and Lados 
2004:280). Based on this definition, it can 
be asserted that case studies are quite inap-
propriate for evaluating EU regional policy. 
Although they can provide an exact picture 
of a specific project (Evalsed 2003), they can 
only be used with reservations to draw con-
clusions on an aggregated national or re-
gional level. For this reason, the Hungarian 
National Bank (MNB 2006) examination takes 
no account of the conclusions to be drawn 
from case studies when analysing the effects of 
funds spent. Some, however, argue that it is 
worth examining the conclusions to be drawn 
from case studies (e.g. Ederveen et al., 2003, 
Tavistock Institute/GHK/IRS 2003). 
Numerous case studies appear in evalua-
tion literature. Some focus on the way funds 
are spent, others on what lessons can be 
drawn from control of the project in local 
practice, while others again try to draw 
macro-level conclusions on various subjects 
involved. These last examine, for example, 
effects on levels of occupation (CSES 2006), 
partnerships (Tavistock Institute/Ecotec 
1999), technology (Ade/Enterprise/Zenit 
1999), and small and medium-sized busi-
nesses (Ernst & Young 1999). It will be 
shown in the following, supported by the 
work of Ederveen et al., (2003) on the basis 
of the conclusions drawn from case studies, 
how efficient EU cohesion policy is. 
The author agrees with the MNB (2006) 
study’s claim that if case studies only pro-
vide statistics detailing the “motorway kilo-
metres” completed or the number of jobs 
created, there are no really far-reaching 
conclusions to be drawn on the results of 
European policy. But in very general terms, 
case studies are carried out in just this spirit. 
They show the social and economic situation 
in a given region and the way Union funds 
are used, and sometimes, what difficulties 
were encountered (Stéclebout 2002). In 
some cases they conclude that the evaluation 
process must be developed in order to draw 
appropriate conclusions from it. 
Ederveen et al., (2003) discuss a research 
project investigating the effects of support 
financed from the structural funds, mainly 
employing case studies and in-depth inter-
views. The project studied regions that re-
ceived support on the basis of Objective 2, 
i.e. mainly attempting to solve employment 
problems in industries suffering the conse-
quences of structural changes. The effect 
could thus indeed be measured by the num-
ber of workplaces created. The researches 
estimated that the €6 billion devoted to Ob-
jective 2 money created approximately 
850,000 “gross” and 450,000 “net” jobs. 
The difference can be explained by the 
crowding-out effect of the national supports 
for regions and non-supported companies 
and employees. In other words, EU aid 
crowded out non-supported companies (Ed-
erveen et al., 2003:26). However, it was not 
possible to conclude from the case studies 
how the employment rate would have devel-
oped in the absence of supports. What also 
emerged was the damage done to the princi-
ple of additionality, since the national gov-
ernments tended to withhold their own aid 
in areas where payments were being re-
ceived from Brussels. 
In conclusion, Ederveen et al. (2003) es-
tablished from the case studies that the effi-
ciency of cohesion aid is very rarely calcula-
ble and in most cases is modest and only 
mildly positive. The case studies did, how-
ever, show that local authority practices 
were affected by the EU support, mainly in 
the spheres of cooperation, partnership and 
strategic planning. But several studies also 
showed a tendency to rent-seeking behav-
iour. Regional plans in particular are often 
designed to receive structural funds’ money 
rather than help efficient allocation expen-
diture. 
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4) MODEL SIMULATIONS 
The second method of examination to assess 
is the use of modelling. This can complement 
the theoretical deficiencies of case studies in 
many respects. With the help of models it is 
easy to establish the extent to which cohe-
sion funds on the macro level have contrib-
uted to increasing employment or to GDP 
growth. Furthermore, a model is able to de-
scribe the situation that would have oc-
curred if there had been no EU support. This 
latter function is important because slow 
growth and the simultaneous presence of 
structural support do not necessarily signify 
ineffectiveness of the aid as the situation 
might have been much worse without the 
support. 
It has been mentioned that the effects and 
effectiveness of structural funds can be ex-
amined on various levels. If single projects 
(e.g. motorway construction projects) are 
investigated, traditional cost/benefit analy-
sis8 can yield an appropriate ranking order 
according to rate of return. But this kind of 
analysis cannot calculate spill-over effects or 
the positive or negative externalities that 
must be included in the effects of a whole EU 
programme. In view of the scale of expendi-
ture of the structural funds (including the 
pressure caused by difficulties brought 
about in domestic fiscal policy), it is impor-
tant to examine the effects in a context that 
includes feedback effects, relationships, 
spill-overs and external effects for the whole 
economy. Then good use can be made of na-
tional and regional economic models, such 
as the input–output models (I–O), econo-
metric models, computable general equilib-
rium models (CGEs) and dynamic growth 
                                                   
8 For more on the advantages and drawbacks of 
cost/benefit analysis, see  
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgen
er/evaluation/ 
evalsed/downloads/sb2_cost_benefit_analysis.doc. 
models. These are able to focus on the 
changes in a country and analyse its geo-
graphical situation.9  
Model simulations are particularly suit-
able in that they are not limited to short-
term demand effects, but able to describe 
long-term supply-side consequences, which 
are far more difficult to express in numeri-
cal terms. These consequences are just as-
sumptions, as they only appear later and 
only if the programme is successful (Gács 
and Halpern 2006). In practice many mod-
els exist, some emphasizing the demand side 
effects and some the changes on the supply 
side. Some models deal with whole coun-
tries, others with the effects of supports re-
gion by region. 
Development aid and investments also 
appear in regional models as external fac-
tors. Unlike national models, they include 
mobility of the labour force, the sectoral 
structure of investment, and the spatial ef-
fects of transport projects. But difficulties 
can be caused because certain data are diffi-
cult to measure or simply unavailable on a 
regional level. These include links between 
sectors and firms, or commercial data for 
trade between regions. Forman (2001) men-
tions three such models:10 the regional VAR 
(Vector Autoregressive), the structural VAR, 
and the regional CGE (computable general 
equilibrium) models. Recent investigation of 
the effects of Hungary’s second national de-
velopment plan, however, involved prepar-
ing a complex macro-regional EcoRET model, 
which can also be used at county level 
(Varga 2007). This model simulates the ef-
fects of the EU funds arriving in Hungary 
                                                   
9 In the 1980s, the returning popularity of growth 
theory also led to an increasing interest in measuring 
the effects of interventions, but empirical growth 
studies remained predominantly aggregate and cross-
county, rather than disaggregated and country-
specific (Bradley 2006). The revival of economic ge-
ography brought a spatial approach into the models 
(Krugman 1991). 
10 Forman (2001:232–241) introduces the models on 
the basis of The socio-economic impact of the projects 
financed by the Cohesion Fund. A modelling ap-
proach. Vol. 1–3. Brussels: European Commission, 
1999. 
11 
over the 2007–13 period right up to 2017.11 
On this basis, the following effects can be 
expected on a national level: average GDP 
growth of 7 per cent; a growth-rate jump to 
1.87 per cent following the initial demand 
shock, but reduction as the cycle progresses 
and becoming negative in 2014, while the 
model predicts an employment effect of ap-
proximately 3.5 per cent (Varga 2007:78, 
80–82). 
The so-called macro-models dealing with 
whole countries treat the country as one unit 
(or point) and take no account of regional 
differences or internal migration. The basis 
for these models is provided by theoretically 
consistent, general equilibrium models 
whose parameters are partly calibrated on 
the results of earlier empirical studies, and 
partly on assumptions. The funds are con-
sidered as state-led, capital-increasing in-
vestments in various sectors of the economy, 
and assumptions are made about their pro-
ductivity and effectiveness on that basis. 
Thus the simulations show the potential ef-
fects of the EU structural funds, i.e. they an-
swer the question of how the economy 
would develop in the short and long term if 
the distribution mechanism, coordination 
and realization of the project were com-
pleted in the best possible way (MNB 2006). 
The best-known demand-side model to 
measure the effects of the transfer of struc-
tural funds (according to Forman 2001) is 
the Beutel model, which details the growth 
in demand caused by transfers in a simple 
national-economy input-output table. Using 
the model in an ex ante examination in 
2002, it was concluded that Community in-
terventions in the 2002–612 period brought 
the greatest growth to Portugal and Greece, 
where GDP grew by 3.5 and 2.2 per cent 
respectively thanks to these interventions 
(Beutel 2002:13). Significant effects were 
predicted for Eastern Germany (1.6 per 
cent) and Spain (1.1 per cent). According to 
                                                   
11 Another model simulation used for Hungary has 
been the so called Eco-Trend model developed by 
EcoStat (EcoStat 2007:47–70). 
12 The model was created in 2002, so that it makes a 
prediction rather than an ex post analysis. 
the study, none of the examined countries 
would have been able to achieve growth 
above the EU average by relying exclusively 
on its own resources. 
Supply-side models offer another ap-
proach to the effects of Community transfers 
by starting from the assumption that the ef-
fect of external transfers cannot be ex-
plained by simple quantitative adaptation of 
unchanged economic structures. The final 
effect of the aid is also influenced by the ac-
tive decision-making process of economic 
actors and their adaptive behaviour. Basic to 
the supply-side approach is that it examines 
the spill-over effects between different sec-
tors and regions and can estimate the struc-
tural funds’ short-term crowding-out effect 
on private investment. Supply-side models 
include the QUEST13 and Pereira models. 
QUEST is generally adopted in the Union to 
evaluate any type of Community policy, 
while Pereira deals specifically with Portugal 
and was not designed at the request of the 
EU (Forman 2001). 
The ex post simulations using the QUEST 
model to examine the 2000–6 financial 
planning period support the Beutel model in 
concluding that the effects of structural 
funds on GDP level were positive. But in the 
QUEST model the effects show up as weaker 
(1) because of the deteriorating external 
balance caused by long-run real currency 
appreciation and rising real interest rates, 
and (2) because EU supports crowd out pri-
vate investment (MNB 2006). The results in 
figures for the period 2000–6 were addi-
tional  GDP growth of 0.5–1.4 per cent (for 
Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal). The 
                                                   
13 The Community originally commissioned the QUEST 
model to model the effects of monetary union. It is a 
supply model that analyses the effects of asymmetric 
economic shocks on countries taking part in the 
monetary union. In QUEST, whole sectors are intro-
duced in lesser detail, but in geographical terms a far 
greater territory is encompassed, as the model covers 
all the EU economies. QUEST is the only model that has 
managed to integrate all countries making net contri-
butions to the structural funds, and so integrate the 
effects of the regional policy on the whole EU. It is 
also the model that covers most fully the mechanisms 
that bring about crowding-out effects (Forman 
2001:229, Veld 2007:4-5). 
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crowding-out and real appreciation effects 
came into effect quite quickly in the model, 
by the third or fourth year of the seven-year 
cycle. 
The QUEST model was used more recently 
(Veld 2007) to examine the effects of EU 
transfers in member-states between 2007 
and 2013, with similar conclusions. In the 
cohesion countries, the take-off in demand 
(after expenditures resulting from the struc-
tural funds) was less than expected (Figure 
2). However, slow improvement on the sup-
ply side was observed. In the long term, the 
growth in public-sector investment brought 
positive external effects, which in turn 
brought a significant benefit in output, espe-
cially productivity improvement. But in the 
short term the growth may be accompanied 
by crowding out of private-sector invest-
ment. 
The first attempts to evaluate cohesion aid 
with model simulations were carried out 
with the HERMES model. This was originally 
designed to analyse the demand shocks of 
the 1970s and 1980s, but in its entirety was 
only used for Ireland (see Ederveen et al., 
2003:28). A little later, the HERMIN model 
filled the geographical deficiency.14 
The HERMIN model is a good example of 
the combination of the demand and supply 
side models. It takes into account the fact 
that the support of structural funds increases 
demand and can also apply to the supply 
side, because basically it is “a neo-Keynesian 
model with some neo-classical features in 
the supply side” (EC 2004:90), and, since it 
is designed explicitly to measure the effects 
of cohesion policy, one of the special fea-
tures of the model is that it is capable of ana-
lysing in a refined system the different types 
of support offered by the whole cohesion 
programme. 
According to the HERMIN model during the 
1994–1999 financial period, the effects of 
the structural supports on Spain, Greece and 
Ireland were positive, but relatively modest. 
                                                   
14 The origins of the HERMIN model can be traced to 
the complex, multi-sector HERMES model developed by 
the European Commission from the beginning of the 
1980s. It was intended to learn from HERMES, incor-
porate many of its structural features, but be on a 
more modest scale, i.e. a minimal version (HERmes 
MINimal) (Bradley 2006:198). 
Figure 2 
The effect of cohesion policy in the EU, according to the QUEST model 
(2007–15) 
 
Note: NMS = new member-states. 
Source: Veld (2007:15). 
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They increased GDP by approximately 1-1.5 
per cent over the period, and 0.5-1 per cent 
in the longer term, in other words on a per-
manent basis. For Portugal, however, the ef-
fects were much greater, 3-3.5 per cent and 
2 per cent respectively (Bradley et al., 
1995). 
In their most recent work, Bradley and 
colleagues (2007) estimated the effects after 
the 2000–2006 and 2007–13 financial pe-
riods. Their analysis is based on the cohesion 
programme’s total real expenditure devoted 
to special areas in Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Eastern German Ländern and the 
regions in Italy in the Objective 1 area. This 
model also shows the initial positive effect of 
the cohesion policy: in most member states 
absolute GDP is 5–10 per cent higher than 
without intervention. According to projec-
tions, an extra 2 million net workplaces will 
have been created (Table 3a and 3b). 
Aid from the EU can be expected to have 
different effects in different member-states, 
which can be explained partly by widely dif-
fering levels of financial support available, 
and partly by differences of economic struc-
ture. The factors in the HERMIN model most 
influencing growth are the structure of the 
economic sectors, their indicators, how ca-
pable the industrial sector is of adjusting to 
productivity growth caused by technological 
development, openness to the world trade 
network, and wage flexibility. 
The fourth cohesion report (EC 2007) in-
troduces another macro model that analyses 
the effects on the 2007–13 budget period: 
the EcoMod model, a multi-sector “recur-
sive/dynamic” computable, general-
equilibrium model, with detailed representa-
tion of the structure of the economy, notably 
the behaviour and interaction of different 
sectors, different types of economic agent 
(households, firms, etc.) and different types 
of economic behaviour (consumption, pro-
duction, investment, etc.). The model is 
therefore well-designed to capture struc-
tural shifts, trade effects and dynamic sup-
ply-side gains—a key aim of cohesion pol-
Table 3a 
HERMIN: The effects of cohesion policy 
2000–6 on national GDP  
and employment in 2006 
 
Table 3b 
HERMIN: The effects of cohesion policy 
2007–13 on national GDP 
and employment in 2015 
 
Country 
GDP gain 
(% above 
baseline) 
Employment 
gain 
(% above 
baseline) 
Employment 
gain 
(1000s above 
baseline) 
Country 
GDP gain 
(% above 
baseline) 
Employment 
gain 
(% above 
baseline) 
Employment 
gain 
(1000s above 
baseline) 
Bulgaria - - - Bulgaria 5.9 3.2 90.4 
Czech Republic 1.6 0.8 39.4 Czech Republic 9.1 7.1 327.8 
Estonia 1.8 1.3 7.9 Estonia 8.6 5.4 31.0 
Ireland 0.9 0.7 12.9 Ireland 0.6 0.4 8.2 
Greece 2.8 2.0 85.2 Greece 3.5 2.3 95.0 
Spain 1.0 0.7 133.5 Spain 1.2 0.8 156.7 
Cyprus 0.1 0.1 0.4 Cyprus 1.1 0.9 3.1 
Latvia 1.6 1.2 11.7 Latvia 9.3 6.0 55.4 
Lithuania 1.2 0.9 12.4 Lithuania 8.3 4.8 67.7 
Hungary 0.6 0.6 22.1 Hungary 5.4 3.7 147.3 
Malta 0.4 0.4 0.6 Malta 4.5 4.0 6.9 
Poland 0.5 0.4 50.3 Poland 5.4 2.8 384.2 
Portugal 2.0 1.4 70.6 Portugal 3.1 2.1 104.8 
Romania - - - Romania 7.6 3.2 267.5 
Slovakia 0.7 0.5 11.3 Slovakia 6.1 4.0 87.9 
Slovenia 0.3 0.3 2.3 Slovenia 2.5 1.7 15.7 
Eastern Germany 0.9 0.7 53.0 Eastern Germany 1.1 0.9 60.0 
Mezziogiorno (Italy) 1.1 0.8 55.7 Mezziog. (Italy) 1.5 0.9 60.1 
Total   569.3 Total   1,969.7 
Source: EC (2007:96) 
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icy—but is not suitable for measuring short-
term, year-on-year changes (EC 2007:97). 
According to the investigation (EcoMod 
2007), political intervention in all member-
states—particularly new member-states that 
enjoy greater financial support—has a 
markedly positive effect. In Slovakia, Lithua-
nia, Latvia and Bulgaria, GDP will be ap-
proximately 15 per cent higher by 2020 as a 
result of intervention than it would have 
been without it. The projections indicate that 
the effect will be slightly larger after 2015 
than before, due to higher productivity, a 
better-trained workforce and better infra-
structure. Thus intervention will reinforce 
the supply side of the economy and put its 
growth on a higher and more sustainable 
path. 
However, two other factors must be con-
sidered: (1) the continuous increase in 
growth rate and its further improvement 
after the financial period depend on the exe-
cution of other policies designed to improve 
the supply side; and (2) the extent of the ef-
fects is sensitive to the assumptions made 
about the elasticity of productivity growth to 
increases in the capital stock, which are 
relatively uncertain. In other words, these 
effects will vary from country to country, 
partly due to the differences in the funds in-
volved, and partly due to the structure of the 
country’s economy: those with a significant 
agricultural sector and other industrial sec-
tors will show less effect than those with 
more developed service and hi-tech sectors 
(EC 2007). 
The main engine of growth is investment 
in the physical and human resource areas. 
Though all sectors will feel the effects of 
higher growth, benefits will be highest in 
the construction industry, thanks to the in-
frastructure projects, and in the high-
technology industry, thanks to the better-
educated and trained workforce. (EcoMod 
2007) 
Following these model simulations leads 
to the conclusion that EU structural supports 
contribute significantly to economic growth 
and employment in the targeted countries. 
However, the criticisms of Ederveen et al. 
(2003) should be borne in mind: that the 
simulations’ estimates are not accurate and 
much more affected by the models’ basic as-
sumptions than by what really happens in 
the support schemes. This criticism is impor-
tant because the models are often produced 
to order from the Commission, which intro-
duces the problem of subjectivity (Ederveen 
et al., 2003:29). Thus the model simulations 
only show one possible effect, which can be 
reduced by the processes really occurring, 
the crowding-out effect, the inefficient allo-
cation of resources, and the phenomenon of 
rent-seeking. 
5) ECONOMETRIC STUDIES 
Two basic types of econometric study can be 
identified. One seeks indirect evidence of the 
effects relating to cohesion policy, while the 
other examines directly in what proportion 
EU supports contribute to regional growth. 
In this way the ex post econometric studies 
are an excellent complement to the evalua-
tions carried out by previously prepared, ex 
ante model simulations. There are several 
works that give a comprehensive picture of 
econometric studies, such as Eckey and 
Türck (2006) and Rodokanakis (2003). 
Notable among the studies accounting for 
indirect effects is the one by De la Fuente 
and Vives (1995), which paints a positive 
picture of the effects of regional policy. They 
estimate a growth model that includes pub-
lic and human capital. They conclude that 
infrastructure and education largely deter-
mine the location of mobile production fac-
tors. De la Fuente and Vives use their esti-
mates to simulate the effect of cohesion sup-
port on growth, thereby taking crowding out 
into account. Since the extent to which 
crowding out occurs is unknown, they as-
sume exogenous lower and upper bounds in 
their model. Their simulations show that 
public investment in infrastructure and edu-
cation may indeed help to reduce regional 
disparities in income and growth of GDP per 
capita. 
15 
The ERDF in particular, because of its re-
distributive nature, has helped to achieve 
more equality across regions in Spain. It 
shows that although the role of regional 
funds in reducing regional differences in 
Spain was small (responsible for a mere 1 
per cent reduction in inequality during the 
1980s), the supply-side regional policy 
(such as infrastructural investment) was 
very effective. In their opinion the transfer 
effect was positive and the reason why the 
results were not yet visible was that distribu-
tion was on too small a scale. 
However, De la Fuente and Vives (1995) 
also touch on the efficiency-equity trade-off 
of regional policy. If all regional funds were 
distributed according to the same redistribu-
tive principles as the ERDF, the dispersion of 
labour productivity would have been less. At 
the same time, Spanish national output 
would have fallen due to less efficient allo-
cation of capital. 
Most studies examining the direct effects 
deal with regional growth, i.e. whether there 
is any convergence on a European level. 
Some find support for convergence, others 
yield either mixed results, or are less positive 
on the growth effect of cohesion support, of 
which more later. Studies use different theo-
retical approaches, for example the neo-
classical growth theory (Sala-i-Martin et al., 
2004), the endogenous growth theory (Ro-
mer 1990), or the new economic geography 
approach (Midelfart, Knarvik and Overman 
2002). They take into account the effects of 
infrastructure development, and according 
to Rodokanakis (2003), do not claim that 
regional policy itself helps the process of 
convergence, but that it can facilitate it 
through infrastructure development. Martin 
(1998) studied whether there would have 
been faster convergence and greater growth 
in the 1978–92 period if infrastructure in-
vestment had been higher. The study showed 
that the central, rich regions of the poor 
countries benefited much more than their 
poorer regions. These conclusions agree 
with those of the new economic geography 
approach (Krugman 1991). Differences be-
tween regions cannot be reduced by state 
infrastructural development, since these 
only favour richer regions (Martin 1999). 
However, they should stimulate inter-
regional trade and make the country more 
attractive.  
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) 
also use the new economic geography model 
and reach the conclusion that the regional 
supports should strengthen the comparative 
advantage of the country and the region, as 
regions with a highly trained workforce 
should attract incoming R and D-intensive 
industries. They stress the importance of 
education expenditure, as do Rodriges-Pose 
and Fratesi (2004) in their examination of 
the regions in the Objective 1 category. Ac-
cording to their research, funds devoted to 
infrastructure, and to a lesser extent busi-
ness support, do not produce significant re-
turns on commitments. Support for agricul-
ture only has a short-term positive effect on 
growth (which wanes quickly), but, invest-
ment in education and human capital 
(which make up one-eight of the total com-
mitment) yield positive, significant returns 
in the medium term. Examination of these 
shows that the convergence process cannot 
be isolated unambiguously. When national 
growth rates are built into their model, no 
regional convergence is experienced and 
analysis of the Objective 1 regions also 
shows a meagre rate of convergence. 
In Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) the 
concept appears of moral hazard, which can 
occur if member-states do not make invest-
ments in certain regions, and keep their 
standard of living low, so ensuring their le-
gal entitlement to supports. The authors 
built an index into the regression balance to 
indicate each country’s level of corruption. 
The results do not support the assumption 
that more corrupt countries use structural 
funds less efficiently. Their results show that 
the less “clean” (more corrupt) countries do 
not gain less economic growth from struc-
tural funds. But their model does show the 
phenomenon of regional convergence. 
Ederveen et al. (2006), in a widely cited 
work,15 addresses evaluation of the effec-
                                                   
15 And recently widely criticized one. See Bradley and 
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tiveness of cohesion policy using a single-
equation, panel-dataset approach. The re-
sults support a serious critique of cohesion 
policy, asserting that its effectiveness is con-
ditional on country characteristics that may 
be in short supply in many poorer member 
states (e.g. the quality of public institutions), 
and that cohesion policies should not be im-
plemented in the new member-states unless 
the institutional capacities are installed. 
According to the study carried out by 
Boldrin and Canova (2001) structural funds 
do not contribute to economic growth at all. 
In essence the funds are subordinated to 
goals which are rather functions of a gen-
eral European political balance, and of 
which only a few are designed to achieve 
economic growth. The authors therefore call 
for drastic restructuring of the structural 
supports and express doubts about the fi-
nancing of new accession states. They be-
lieve economic growth and convergence are 
best encouraged in a “traditional” way, with 
economic policy tools that are as market-
oriented as possible. 
Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996) also 
take a negative view of the role of cohesion 
supports. They tend to be a drawback of cer-
tain factors in the cohesion process, such as 
the direction of R and D investment (as did 
the Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002). 
Their results do not support the existence of 
the convergence process. 
It has been seen that the econometric 
models paint a generally more pessimistic 
picture of the effects of development funds. 
They attempt to estimate the real effects of 
the supports (as opposed to the potential fig-
ures produced by model simulations) and 
they do not assume the productivity of in-
vestment, the lack of a crowding-out effect 
or the adequate realization of the principle 
of additionality. However critical assessment 
of econometric studies is needed as well. 
Most importantly, data necessary for the 
construction of the models may be lacking 
or unreliable, the data series available may 
not cover the appropriate time periods, and 
                                                                              
Unitedt 2008. 
so describing the long-term effects of the 
structural funds in figures becomes harder. 
These are serious problems that may out-
weigh the advantages of econometric stud-
ies, but the nature of the question itself 
makes proportional statistical assessment 
difficult (EcoStat 2007). 
6) SO WHAT IS THE REAL RESULT?  
To follow through the most important ele-
ments of the evaluation methods it is worth 
returning to Figure 1 and asking the ques-
tions again: (1) Is EU cohesion policy appro-
priate (relevant, reasonable)? This can be 
answered if the policy set-up and the meas-
ures it uses are seen to be relevant to solu-
tion of the problem. At the level of cohesion 
policy as a whole, the problems have been 
defined like this: the economic, social and 
territorial disparities have existed for a long 
period and we would like to reduce them 
with the help of the structural funds and co-
hesion fund. In practice the lion’s share of 
the supports (to simplify the situation) has 
been devoted to infrastructure and human-
resource development and the policy has 
become more concentrated on certain re-
gions (Molle 2006). Bearing all this in mind, 
there is no reason to argue with the appro-
priateness of regional policy. 
The second question: (2) Is the Commu-
nity’s regional policy effective? The inter-
ventions can be described as effective if they 
have produced the ex ante expected effects 
and the objectives of them have been 
achieved. The effectiveness of interventions 
is not easy to establish. In practice one 
started by answering the following ques-
tions: Did the structural funds’ supports 
reach the appropriate regional target 
groups? Have the supports been spent on the 
kind of programmes and projects that fur-
ther the policy’s objectives? But these ques-
tions, according to Molle (2006:6), do not 
get to the heart of the matter. It has been 
seen that the main objective of cohesion pol-
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icy is to reduce disparities and so the real 
question research needs to answer is 
whether  the structural funds have contrib-
uted to a reduction of these disparities, or 
whether the observed reduction would have 
occurred anyway? The answer to this was 
helped by considering methodological is-
sues. It has been seen that the answer is not 
unequivocal. 
The informal methods-based case studies, 
the model simulations and the econometric 
estimates do not provide a consistent picture. 
The methods produce differing evaluation 
results as well, since the various methodolo-
gies have strengths and weaknesses in dif-
ferent areas, and so the specific questions 
they can answer differ as well. To some ex-
tent these differences are to be expected. 
Case studies portray the attributes of a pro-
ject, the nature of the environment and the 
process of implementation, but they are not 
always appropriate for calculating the effect 
of the funds or drawing macro-level conclu-
sions. Model simulations give the possible 
extent of the effects in an optimal political 
situation (measuring the potential impact), 
while econometric studies seek to match the 
existing effects to some trend, detail the 
causes and reasons and attempt to estimate 
the actual effects of the supports. The results 
of these last are the most pessimistic and 
many of them point to ineffectiveness or 
even detrimental effects from the funds 
(Fagerberg and Verspagen 1996).  
Why does the policy not achieve the in-
tended effects? Why is it only effective to a 
limited extent? The lessons drawn from the 
evaluations suggest that various contributing 
factors: 
∗ Compared to national development funds, 
EU supports have a crowding-out effect 
(Ederveen et al., 2003; Veld 2007). 
Though the principle of additionality or 
co-funding exists in EU regional policy, a 
study carried out by Ederveen et al. 
(2003:61) shows that on average a region 
forgoes €0.17 of national regional aid for 
each €1 of EU cohesion support. 
∗ EU funds replaces other convergence 
mechanisms. For example, the increase in 
labour mobility will be reduced by EU 
supports to backward regions (Boldrin 
and Canova 2001). Alternatively, cohe-
sion support may crowd out private in-
vestment if it goes on projects that are 
close substitutes for private capital. 
∗ Various methodological approaches have 
shown the existence of rent-seeking and 
moral hazard (Váradi 2006; Beugelsdijk 
and Eijffinger 2005), as have case studies 
(e.g. Stéclebout 2002). Regional and na-
tional authorities may use funds for rela-
tively low-productive projects on purpose. 
∗ The European policy of promoting re-
gional growth is only conditionally effec-
tive (Ederveen et al., 2006). European 
support enhances growth in countries 
with the “right” institutions; funds are to 
go for institution building in the first in-
stance. Once the institutions are of suffi-
cient quality, the funds may become ef-
fective in stimulating (catch-up) growth. 
∗ The effects of EU intervention have coun-
terbalanced national policy (Midelfart-
Knarvik and Overman 2002). 
∗ It is important to mention the literature on 
the new economic geography, even 
though it has not been presented in detail 
in this analysis. With the process of eco-
nomic integration (or the reduction in 
trade costs) economic activity is more 
likely to be concentrated in central, and 
also richer regions, and this is particularly 
true for industrial sectors with higher 
added value. For this reason the periphery 
will tend to specialize in manufacturing 
activity, which requires less qualified la-
bour force. (See the studies by Krugman 
1991, Martin 1999, Puga 2002, Midel-
fart-Knarvik and Overman 2002, or Rod-
riguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004). 
∗ The consequence of this factor may also 
cause most of the supports to flow into rela-
tively rich regions (Ederveen et al., 2003). 
∗ The question also arises of whether the 
money devoted to regional development 
was not spent on the most appropriate 
objectives. Many studies reject the cur-
rent practice, which is focused on infra-
structure and small and medium size en-
terprises, and call instead for support for 
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education and human resources (Martin 
1999, Eckey – Türck 2006, Veld 2007, 
Rodriges-Pose – Fratesi 2004 and EcoMod 
2007). 
∗ Several studies (e.g. Armstrong 2002; 
ESPON 2005:5) have suggested it is possi-
ble that there has not yet been enough 
time to see the results and that the sums 
involved are too small to bring spectacu-
lar results.  
Of course regional development pro-
grammes should not be seen as successful 
only if they reduce regional differences. Ac-
cording to the political science approach 
(Allen 2005; Keating 1997) the agreements 
reached on regional programmes and the 
division of funds bring a positive benefit in 
that individual states are forced to work 
more closely together, and this in the long 
run helps the process of integration. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has sought to consider the meth-
ods used to evaluate EU regional policy. It 
can be stated that examinations based on 
computable general-equilibrium models and 
input/output analyses predict greater 
growth effects than studies using regression 
analysis. This is primarily because the results 
of model simulations estimate an upper limit 
for the expected effects—the result that is to 
be expected if the funds are used appropri-
ately and efficiently—while the results of 
econometric analyses reflect the imperfec-
tions of real events. The estimates from the 
first type of study are expected to be higher 
than those from the second. The differences 
are not necessarily inconsistent. Indeed the 
various results are complementary: the po-
tential impact can be set against the actual 
impact. To bridge the gap is, of course, the 
challenge for future reforms of cohesion 
policy. 
 
* * * * * 
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